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  1Abstract 
 
The paper applies a policy learning perspective on policy change in the European Union. Based on 
the idea that complex empirical phenomena require complex analytical tools, the paper argues that 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a suitable approach to the analysis of policy learning 
when rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism are incorporated into the 
approach so as to address some analytical weak points of the ACF. The paper then asks if any 
conditions can be identified under which one of the two institutionalisms hold more explanatory 
power than the other institutionalism. By applying the revised ACF to the analysis of an empirical 
case of policy learning, consisting of the energy-companies Shell, BP and Exxon Mobile, it is 
shown that the incorporation of the institutionalisms in the ACF produces some valuable insights 
and that the time-span included in the empirical analysis constitutes an important factor as to the 
explanatory power of each of the institutionalisms. 
 
 
This article is developed on the basis of the master’s thesis, A Changing Policy Climate – An 
Analysis of Policy Learning and Change in Renewable Energy Policy, Department of European 
Political and Administrative Studies, College of Europe, 2006/07. Please consult this document for 
an elaboration of the discussions below. 
  2At the summit of the European Council 8-9 March 2007 it was decided that 20% of the energy 
consumption of the European Union is to be produced from renewable energy sources (RES) in 
2020.
1 It is not more than a decade ago that RES emerged as a comprehensive policy field with the 
1997 White Paper on RES,
2 and it was not until 2001 that legislation on the promotion of RES was 
adopted (though it was limited to RES-E, electricity produced from RES).
3 Against this background 
it is clear that the Council-decision
4 constitutes a major policy change in European RES-policy.
5  
When explaining policy change one obvious explanation is that the change came about 
because it was in the interest of central actors. This superficial answer is not satisfactory as it only 
displaces the explanation from a level of political action to a level of political interests. 
Correspondingly the question simply changes to how this change in preferences then came about.
6  
One interesting way of studying changes in political preferences is a learning perspective.
7 
Learning is here understood as “a relatively enduring alteration in behavior that results from 
experience.”
8 A learning perspective seeks to capture the processes of policy learning that the actors 
have undergone that have led to the change in preferences.  
A learning perspective on policy change in the European Union is, however, a demanding 
                                                 
1 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusion 8/9 March, 72224/07, 9 March 2007. 
2 Commission of the European Communities, Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy, COM(97)599 final, 
26 November 1997.   
3 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 2001/77/EC, on the promotion of electricity 
produced form renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market, 27 September 2001. 
4 The decision is only politically binding. The overall target is to be converted into specific targets for the member states 
and at the time of writing the Commission expects to present its legislative proposal in the autumn of 2007.  
5 The decision is ambitious due to the great challenges that it raises for the RES-E industry to deliver the technical 
development that is needed to fulfill the target and due to the economical costs in terms of different direct or indirect 
subsidies to RES-E that is being put on electricity-consumers. Furthermore it challenges the long standing right of the 
member states to choose their own energy-mix by effectively imposing certain quotas of RES-E on these. 
6 Peter A. Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, April 1993, p. 275. 
7 Elizabeth Bomberg, ‘Policy learning in an enlarged European Union: environmental NGOs and new policy 
instruments’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2, March 2007, p. 257. 
8 Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1974, p. 306. Learning does, though, not have to be expressed as an alteration of behaviour. 
Learning can also be defined as learning what not to do and thus staying on the same course. The definition above is, 
however, adequate for the discussion of this paper.  
 
  3approach. Policy processes of the EU are, first of all, a complex phenomenon and an equally 
complex model of policy learning is needed to capture this complexity. Second of all is the question 
of how learning should be understood analytically in the first place.  
Rational choice institutionalism and sociological neo-institutionalism are two of the most 
common ways that modern political science understands agency such as learning. At the same time, 
the two new institutionalisms represent two opposed camps in one of the most polarized debates of 
modern political science.
9 Scholars differ widely on which new institutionalism that is more 
appropriate one when analyzing EU policies. This paper asks two methodological questions.  
First, with the debate between the two new institutionalisms in mind, the paper asks how 
policy learning should be studied. The paper argues that complex phenomena, such as learning in 
EU policy processes, require complex analytical tools and suggests the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) as a model of policy learning that captures this complexity. There are, though, 
certain flaws in the ACF that limits the analytical potential of the approach. With the debate 
between the two new institutionalisms in mind, the paper therefore argues that both 
institutionalisms, rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, should be 
applied to the analysis of learning and correspondingly integrates them into the ACF.
10  
Secondly, the paper asks if any empirical conditions can be specified under which either of 
the two institutionalisms holds greater explanatory power. It is argued that time can constitute a 
crucial factor that influences the explanatory power of the institutionalisms. If the analysis focuses 
on actors that are embedded in short-term interactions, rational choice institutionalism can 
constitute an adequate perspective to analyzing policy learning. But if the actors are embedded in 
                                                 
9 Martin Van Hess, ‘Explaining Institutions: A defence of reductionism’, European Journal of Political Research, No. 
32, 1997, p. 51. The third institutionalism, historical institutionalism, is not included in the discussion due to the limited 
scope of the thesis. Furthermore it can be argued that historical institutionalism draws on rational choice assumptions, 
although in an institutionally constrained version, wherefore the historical institutionalism to some extent is covered by 
the discussion between rational choice and sociological institutionalism. 
10 Paul A. Sabatier, ‘The need for Better Theories’, in Paul A. Sabatier (ed.) Theories of the Policy Process, Westview 
Press, Boulder, 1999, p. 6.  
  4more long-term interactions, the analysis should be complemented with sociological 
institutionalism.  
The paper proceeds in five parts. First the paper presents the ACF. Secondly, the paper 
points to some analytical flaws of the ACF and addresses these by including the two 
institutionalisms in the model of policy learning. The paper goes on to develop the idea that, 
whereas both institutionalisms could potentially be applied to the analysis of policy learning, there 
might be different empirical conditions under which the two institutionalisms differ in explanatory 
power. Fourthly, the above outlined policy change in EU RES-E policy between 1997 and 2007 is 
included as an empirical case to test a.) the analytical usefulness of the revised ACF; and b.) to 
identify under which empirical conditions the two institutionalisms hold the most explanatory 
power. Fifthly a conclusion answers the two questions of this paper on the basis of the empirical 
case. 
 
1. The Advocacy Coalition Framework  
EU-policy processes include a variety of actors,
11 and the notion of a subsystem 
captures this pluralism. A subsystem encompasses a variety of actors from different organizations, 
which are actively involved in a policy-issue.
12 For a subsystem to exist, the participants have to: 
1.) regard themselves as a community; 2.) share a domain of expertise that they have sought to 
influence over a period of time; 3.) there have to be specialized units within government agencies 
that deal with the problem; and 4.) there has to exist interest groups that deal with the topic. Thus, 
the ACF maintains an open ontology to the question of which actors are important in a policy area 
and how these position themselves in relation to the policy.  
                                                 
11 Irina Michalowitz, ‘Beyond Corporatism and Pluralism: Towards a New Theoretical Framework’, in Alex Warleigh 
and Jenny Fairbrass (eds), Influence and Interests in the European Union: The New Politics of Persuasion and 
Advocacy, Europa Publications, London, 2002, p. 42. 
12 Paul A. Sabatier & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, ’The Advocacy Coalition  Framework’, in Paul A. Sabatier (ed.) Theories 
of the Policy Process, Westview Press, Boulder, 1999, p. 124. 
  5The ACF is quite all-embracing in its scope when it comes to the number of actors in a 
subsystem.
13 To begin with, the approach includes the traditional political actors in the policy 
process such as institutions, member states and interests groups.  
A subsystem is, however, composed of other actors than the traditional political actors. The 
ACF argues that technical policy analyses, such as a report on the viability of a renewable energy 
support scheme, is used to advocate specific interests in the policy process.
14 For this reason, 
experts, who are often the sources of authority when it comes to technical issues of a policy, should 
also be included in the sub-system. In this way the ACF does more than simply stating that expert 
knowledge matters. The approach goes all the way by including the expert organizations as fully 
fledged political actors.  
The sensitivity towards the role of experts renders the ACF very relevant to the analysis of 
EU-policies, where the level of technicality of the policy process is very high.
15 This is, for 
instance, so when it comes to RES-E policy, where debates take place over the importance of 
externalities from electricity production from fossil fuels, the soundness of market correcting 
mechanisms, and the potential of wind-technology.
16  
The ACF groups the variety of interests in each subsystem into a number of advocacy 
coalitions. Hence, for actors in a subsystem to adhere to the same coalition they have to: a.) share a 
set of normative and causal beliefs; and b.) undertake a more or less coordinated interaction over 
time.
17 The coalitions constitute the conflictual element of the ACF as they seek to realize their 
policy preferences in competition with each other by influencing policy.  
 
                                                 
13 Michael Minstrom & Sandra Vergari, ‘Advocacy Coalitions, Policy Entrepreneurs and Policy Change’, Policy 
Studies Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1996, p. 424. 
14 Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework, op. cit., p. 118. 
15 Paul A. Sabatier, ‘Relevance for Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 5, No. 1., p. 121.   
16  Joseph Szarka, “Wind Power, Discourse Coalition and Climate Change: Breaking the Stalemate”, European 
Environment, Vol. 14, 2004, p. 327. 
17 Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework, op. cit., p. 120. 
  61.1 The Belief System 
In the ACF learning takes place through a modification of the belief systems of the 
actors. Belief systems are divided into a tripartite and hierarchical structure.
18 The most 
fundamental level of the three levels is the deep core level which is composed of normative beliefs 
such as man’s relationships with nature or individual freedom versus social equity. These beliefs are 
so fundamental that they are almost impossible to change and so abstract that they do not serve as 
efficient guides to behavior for the actors.
19 Consequently, this level of analysis is rarely evoked by 
the actors. Correspondingly this paper will not touch upon the deep core beliefs. 
The second level is composed of policy core beliefs representing the causal 
perceptions of an actor and a coalition such as the level of government that is adequate when 
addressing a policy issue, the magnitude of a political problem, e.g. climate change, or the 
importance of economic development vs. environmental protection. Policy core beliefs are 
somewhat difficult to change and learning mainly takes place due to external shocks or learning 
over long periods of time.
20  
The third level, that of the secondary aspects, deals with more narrow beliefs such as policy 
preferences for regulation instruments, e.g. how a support scheme for RES should be elaborated or 
how specific institutions should be designed.
21 Secondary aspects are therefore less resistant to 
change because they involve empirical elements that can be challenged with new data or 
experiences more easily.
 Learning therefore takes place as an instrumental assessment of means to 
achieve an end.
22 Thus actors prefer to make concessions on the secondary aspects before altering 
their policy core values.
23 Consequently, the ACF argues that learning mainly takes place on the 
                                                 
18 Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework, op. cit., p. 121. 
19 Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework, op. cit., p. 131. 
20 Ibid 
21 Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework, op. cit., p. 122. 
22 Ibid 
23 Matthew Zafonte & Paul A. Sabatier, ‘Short-Term Versus Long-Term Coalitions in the Policy Process: Automotive 
  7level of secondary aspects. 
Thus, when it comes to understanding policy change, what matters is to understand the 
policy learning of the actors in the subsystem. The learning changes the preferences of the actors, 
thus altering the relative importance of the coalitions of the subsystem.
24 Thus, in politics the actors 
matter; actors learn and actors convert learning into policy change. Yet the theory of action of the 
ACF is not fully adequate when it comes to conceptualizing the learning that takes place.  
 
2. Agency in the ACF – A Critique 
The ACF argues that “actors’ goals normally are complex and should be ascertained 
empirically.”
25 Thus, interestingly enough, the ACF is a theory of the policy process without a 
theory of agency. The ACF has been criticized for this unwillingness to develop an explicit theory 
of agency, and several scholars have sought to incorporate the “missing theory of action” into the 
ACF.
26 Such attempts, however, have often resulted in the introduction of a rational and self-
interested actor into the ACF, which obviously is incompatible with the claim that actor’s 
preferences should be ascertained empirically.
27  
Yet, at the same time the critique and the attempts to complement the ACF with a model of 
agency seems reasonable.
28 Without a theory of agency the researcher is left without a coherent 
analytical framework. Consequently, the researcher is left with an analytical approach that Sabatier 
himself, paradoxically enough, has criticized for being an approach in which “the analyst 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Pollution Control, 1963-1989’, Policy Studies Journal, 2004, p. 79. 
24 The ACF presents three types of policy learning that can lead to policy learning with the actors in the coalitions; 
learning within the coalitions, learning across the coalitions and external shocks. The limited space does not permit me 
to develop these three types of learning any further wherefore no differentiation is made below between the three types 
of learning. In any case, this does not have any consequences for the overall argument of the paper.  
25 Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework, op. cit., p. 131. 
26 E.g. Edella Schlager, ‘Policy making and collective action: defining coalitions within the advocacy coalition 
framework’, Policy Sciences, Vol. 2, No. p. 249. 
27 Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition Framework, op. cit., p. 139. 
28 Daniel Kübler, ‘Understanding Policy Change with the Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Application to Swiss 
Drug Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 4, August 2001, p. 626. 
  8approaches the world in an implicit, ad hoc fashion, using whatever categories and assumptions 
have arisen from his or her experience. This is essentially the method of common sense.”
29 The lack 
of a clear model of agency inhibits a clear understanding of how learning comes about.  
2.1 Agency in the New Institutionalisms 
In order to develop a more clear understanding of learning, this paper turns to the two 
most common ways of understanding agency in political science: rational choice institutionalism 
and sociological neo-institutionalism. Despite the fact that the two institutionalisms are clearly 
opposed in the political science debate, they have a lot in common. They share an emphasis on three 
central concepts; institutions, preferences and actors. The difference between the two 
institutionalisms consists in the way that these three concepts are combined.
30 
In rational choice institutionalism, preferences are material and given. Correspondingly, the 
institutional context does not change the preferences of the actors, as they are exogenous to the 
institutions. The institutional environment influences the behavior of the actors, but only by acting 
as constraints on the actors and in this way forcing them to alter their strategies and behavior when 
they seek to realize their preferences.31 Hence, given the emphasis on this approach on how actors 
calculate the consequences of their actions out of an ambition to achieve their goals, this way of 
understanding learning is called the logic of consequentiality.
32 Learning takes place when actors 
realize that they need to alter their strategy in order to obtain a certain goal.  
Contrary to rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism views preferences 
as variable and as a function of the institutional context. Preferences are endogenous to the 
                                                 
29 Sabatier, The Need for Better Theories.., op. cit., p. 5. 
30 The two streams of institutionalism should not be regarded as homogenous as there are many divergent 
interpretations of each stream of institutionalism and correspondingly the two logics of action come in different 
variations. Thus, the two logics should be regarded as analytical ideal types. 
31Ben Rosamond, ’New Theories of European Integration’, in M. Cini, European Union Politics, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 110.  
32 James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Order’, International 
Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998, p. 949. 
  9institutions that at any time modify the cognitive perceptions of the actor. Thus, sociological 
institutionalism argues that actors do not learn from an on-going strategic evaluation of the situation 
but through on-going cognitive processes facilitated by the institutional context that renders some 
secondary instruments, or some policy core political objectives, more appropriate than others.33 
Following this line of thought, the theory of agency is called the logic of appropriateness.
34  
By integrating both institutionalisms into the ACF, the “common sense” approach is 
replaced by analytical clarity through the well-defined approach to agency that the two 
institutionalisms represent. At the same time, the empirical openness, which arguably is one of the 
ACF’s strengths when analyzing complex policy-processes, is maintained exactly by applying both 
institutionalisms and not just one.  
By doing so the consequence of the complexity of the EU-policy process is taken 
seriously.
35 In EU policy making, norm-driven and self-interested behavior goes hand in hand.
36 
Actors may learn and change their preferences in RES-E policymaking through a genuine 
preoccupation with the human impact on the balance of the world’s climate, or they may do so out 
of an equally genuine cost-benefit analysis that renders the continuing emission of CO2 
unprofitable due to the environmental consequences of global warming. The richness of the 
empirical phenomenon requires rich and versatile analytical instruments, and the ACF combined 
with the two logics is a strong tool for analyzing policy learning. 
2.2 The New Institutionalisms and the Belief System 
It is, though, not entirely true that the ACF does not have a theory of agency. To a 
                                                 
33 Mark A. Pollack, ’The New Institutionalisms and European Integration’, in A. Wiener and T. Diez (eds) European 
Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 137. 
34 March & Olson, op. cit., p. 952. 
35 The ACF actually argues that secondary preferences can be preferred to an extent that they are situated on the policy 
core level. Again, however, this study will argue that this blurs the analytical clarity. 
36.Johan P. Olsen, ‘Garbage Cans, New Institutionalism, and the Study of Politics’, American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 95, No. 1, 2001, p. 196. 
  10certain extent the ACF does already include the logics of the two institutionalisms.
37 They are, 
however, first of all implicit in the theory, and second of all are both institutionalisms reserved to a 
certain level of the belief system: the logic of appropriateness to the policy core level and the logic 
of consequentiality to the secondary aspect level.  
This idea of different logics on different levels of the belief system does, however, seem 
difficult to uphold. Research conducted on the basis of the ACF has, for instance, shown that 
material groups do not appear to be constrained by fundamental beliefs. On the contrary the 
structure of beliefs seems to be a function of the critical interests of the groups, which in the case of 
material groups often is profit.
38 Thus, the instrumental rationality is not limited to the secondary 
aspect level but can also instrumentalise elements of policy core values, e.g. the right level of 
regulation, when seeking to realize the material preferences.  
Along similar lines the ACF ascertains that actors resist information that can change their 
beliefs, but limits this cognitive learning process to the level of policy core.
39 Yet studies have 
shown that actors can develop an almost religious relation to policy instrument thus favoring one 
instrument over another.
40 Therefore, it does not seem adequate to understand the level of 
secondary aspect as being purely instrumental. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith have considered this 
possibility and argue that policy instruments can be so institutionalized that they become situated at 
a policy core level. Instead of in this way blurring the conceptual clarity between secondary aspects 
as instruments and policy cores as more fundamental beliefs, this paper suggests that cognitive 
learning is not limited to the secondary aspects of a belief system, but that the choice of policy 
                                                 
37 Below the domination “the logics” is used interchangeably with “the institutionalisms” depending on the context. 
Nevertheless, they refer to the same. 
38 Hank Jenkins-Smith & Gilbert St. Clair, ‘The Politics of Offshore Energy: Empirically Testing the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework’, In P. Sabatier and H. Jenkins-Smith, eds., Policy Change and Learning, Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1993, p. 172. 
39 Nohrstedt, Daniel, ‘External Shocks and Policy Change: Three Mile Island and Swedish Nuclear Energy Policy’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 12, No. 6, 2005, p. 1043. 
40 For instance, environmental groups have a strong preference for command-and-control policy instruments in 
environmental policy. Rittberger & Richardson, op. cit., p. 575. 
  11instruments can be a cognitive process.
41  
Thus, the two ways of learning, the cognitive and the rational, should not each be limited to 
a level of the belief system. The belief system and its different levels of beliefs is a very useful tool 
when it comes to structuring the actor’s policy preferences, but whether these preferences are 
guided by logics of consequentiality or logics of appropriateness should be an open and empirical 
question.  
The paper has now incorporated the institutionalisms into the ACF. The inclusion of two 
ontologically opposed logics in the same analytical framework, however, might spur criticisms of 
theoretical incoherence, eclecticism and, as a consequence, an analytically invalid approach. This 
criticism is the object of the next chapter.  
  
3. Is Eclecticism a Problem? 
Let there be no doubt: On a meta-theoretical epistemological and ontological level, the 
two institutionalisms are incommensurable. They rest on abstract assumptions that differ heavily 
and constitute each others oppositions. To transcend the ontological and epistemological differences 
between the two approaches is not the ambition of this paper.
42 This paper takes the position that 
the metatheoretical debates most certainly are important; every student of the social sciences should 
be aware of the differences of the core assumptions of the theories that s/he applies. The debate 
between the two institutionalisms has, however, for too long dead-locked the discipline of political 
science in an unproductive blame game. Instead of seeking to determine which of the two 
institutionalisms constitutes the correct approach, researchers ought to concentrate on developing 
                                                 
41 Paul J. Powell and Walter W. DiMaggio, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective 
Rationality in Organizational Fields, American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1991, p. 150. 
42 Joseph Jupille, James A. Caporaso & Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism and 
the Study of the European Union, Comparative Political Studies, 2003, Vol. 36, No. 7, p. 25. 
  12middle-range theoretical propositions and empirical research.
43 The ambition should not be to 
determine once and for all which of the two institutionalisms holds the most explanatory power per 
se, but to let them complement each other in a fruitful dialogue, where different theoretical 
propositions are tested on a specific empirical question. The EU is a complex phenomenon where 
different logics of political agency operate – as captured by the two institutionalisms - and should 
be studied accordingly. Consequently, the interesting question is transformed from one that asks 
which of the two institutionalisms is the correct one per se, to one that asks if any conditions can be 
identified under which the two institutionalisms hold more explanatory power. When developing 
metatheoretical propositions on policy learning in limited areas such as RES-policy, the challenge is 
therefore to evaluate the two logics against each other. One method of doing so is the ‘Multi-Theory 
Controlled-Competitive Model’, which controls for the explanatory variables in other theories by 
taking factors into account that form part of the other theories.
44  
None of the logics in the analytical model presented above are, however, substantive 
theories that specify a certain relationship between different variables. The two institutionalisms are 
better understood as “approaches to social inquiry that encompasses specific theories”
45 and are 
also used in this way in this paper. Thus, what is controlled for in a research design based on the 
two institutionalisms broadly is simply the empirical understanding of the divergent theory, the 
rivaling institutionalism, of the learning that a certain actor experiences. The paper now turns to 
testing the research design. 
                                                
 
4. Case Selection 
Below the revised ACF is applied to the development of EU RES-E policy in order to: 
 
43 Ibid 
44 Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel also mention three other ways of empirical research design that ensures control. The 
scholars stress that the choice of research design depends on the phenomenon that one wishes to explain. Jupille, 
Caporaso & Checkel, op. cit., p. 26. 
45 Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel, op. cit., p. 11. 
  13a.) test the analytical usefulness of the revised ACF; and b.) to identify under which empirical 
conditions the two institutionalisms hold the most explanatory power. It is only the belief system 
that is applied analytically below, as the objective is to test exactly this part of the ACF in its 
revised form. Furthermore, due to space limitations, the analysis only focuses on one set of actors, 
the energy companies: ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and BP. The latter was formerly British 
Petroleum, but since 2000 has been known only BP to illustrate the ongoing development of the 
company towards an energy portfolio consisting of other energy-sources than oil.
46 
BP, Shell and ExxonMobil are, along with ChevronTexaco and TotalFinaElf, often referred 
to as the five “supermajors” of the oil-industry.
47 Questions are sometimes raised as to the 
motivation of BP and Shell for increasing their support and investment in RES. Graeme Sweeney, 
executive vice-president of ‘Renewables, Hydrogen and CO2’ of Shell, states that “we see a clear 
business opportunity in the wind business.”
48 Hence, it seems plausible that the belief systems of 
the energy companies should be understood as a function of material preferences, and that energy 
companies can be understood as actors that differ from the original belief system of the ACF, where 
immaterial values were listed as guiding factors of the policy core level. Instead their belief system 
is captured by the revised ACF presented above. In this way the energy companies are expected to 
represent a deviation from the default belief system of the ACF, which is exactly the reason why 
they are selected as the case of this paper. Since the policy core of the energy companies can be 
expected to be material, it is a plausible assumption that the logic of consequentiality has some 
analytically productive insights to offer, whereas less analytical strength can be expected from the 
logic of appropriateness. In this way the case represents a least likely case and the argument of the 
                                                 
46 Lise Becker, Materiality and the Enduring Aspects of Organisational Identities, Copenhagen Business School 
Working Paper, p. 13, available at: http://ir.lib.cbs.dk/download/ISBN/x656545916.pdf, 7 May 2007.   
47 Jesse Uzzell, op. cit., p. 167.   
48 The Boston Globe, Two Oil Giants Plunge into the Wind Business, available at: 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/03/02/two_oil_giants_plunge_into_the_wind_business/, 
7 May 2007. 
  14paper, that valuable insight can be produced from both institutionalisms, is consequently 
strengthened if both logics prove to be analytically productive.  
4.1 Energy Companies 
The logic of consequentiality illustrates how the companies have learned as a reaction 
to a changing environment.
49 The environment, i.e. a stable climate, is a public good because 
nobody can be excluded from its consumption and because the consumption of the good by one 
individual does not decrease the utility of its consumption by other individuals.
50 Consequently 
emitters of CO2 do not have any incentive to internalize the externalities, i.e. the damages to the 
climate caused by the emissions of CO2, because the external costs traditionally have not been 
traced back to the emitters and internalized into the costs of their production. Because of the failure 
to internalize the externalities, the price of electricity produced from fossil fuels remains 
comparatively cheaper than RES-E, and energy produced on the basis of fossil fuels therefore 
remains the preferred form of energy of electricity producers and consumers. 
BP and Shell already took a relatively more positive stance on RES-E in 1997, and since 
then the institutional environment has changed. The EU has taken steps to internalize the 
externalities with the Emission Trading Scheme
51 (ETS) so that electricity produced from fossil 
fuels not only reflects the production costs of the electricity producer but also the social costs, 
which facilitates the promotion of RES to the extent that the scheme contributes to the gradual 
narrowing of the price gap between electricity produced from fossil fuels and RES. In this way the 
institutional constraints of the companies were modified when the ETS started operating in January 
2005 as a consequence of the Kyoto Protocol.  
                                                 
49 Raimund Bleischwitz, Michael Latsch & Kristian Snorre Andersen, Sustainable Development and Collective 
Learning: Theory and a European Case Study, BEEP Briefing No. 7, June 2004, available at: 
http://www.coleurop.be/content/studyprogrammes/eco/publications/BEEPs/BEEP7.pdf, 6 May 2007, p. 5. 
50 Ken Heather, Understanding Economics, 3
rd edition, Pearson Education Limited, Essex, 2000, p. 453. 
51 The European Union Gas Emission Trading Scheme aims at limiting the emissions of the EU-member states through 
assigning certain quotas of emissions to especially polluting industries in the EU. started operating in January 2005 as a 
consequence of the Kyoto Protocol and  
  15As a consequence, BP and Shell have modified their preferences and strategy in order to 
utility maximize in the expectation that RES will grow as a business as a consequence of the 
increased costs of fossil fuels.
52 Hence, the firms responded to a changed institutional environment 
that renders investments in RES-E more profitable.
53  
The logic of appropriateness, however, can offer a complementary perspective on learning. 
Rational choice inspired theorists have traditionally argued that ideas certainly matter, but only as 
instrumental “hooks” upon which the actors could hang their material preferences and thus further 
their interests.
54 However, many rational choice scholars have modified their assumptions about the 
rational individual to being only limited rational. This modification inserts a cognitive factor into 
the motivations of the rational actors that permits beliefs, and therefore learning, to become 
influential on a material level.
55 Thus, economic ideas about RES-E policy are important because 
they define what a productive arrangement is.
56 
Oil and gas are often viewed as global industries, and in such industries actors face similar 
competitive conditions, which, according to theory, should create convergent pressures on the 
companies involved in the business.
57 Since the changed institutional environment imposed by the 
ETS is equal for all the actors on the energy-market, it is therefore puzzling why all the major 
energy companies have not made the same calculation as Shell and BP. Over the last ten years 
                                                 
52 Jesse Uzzell, ‘An Institutional Comparison of Two Sectoral Responses to the Political Economy of Climate Change’, 
in Kathryn Begg, Frans van der Woerd and David Levy, The Business of Climate Change, Greenleaf Publishing 
Sheffield, 2005, p. 167. 
53 The ETS is criticised on a number of points notably on the size of the emission quotas granted to the relevant sectors, 
which are widely seen as being too generous and thus not providing any real incentives for firms to change their 
emission behaviour. Nevertheless the point is that with the ETS the EU sends a strong signal of commitment 
greenhouse gas abatement to companies such as BP and Shell, which, despite the current ETS not having serious 
economic consequences at present, leads them to anticipate more efficient regulation in the near future which again 
influences on the companies business decisions.  
54 See e.g. Andrew Moravscik, ‘Constructivism and European Integration: A Critique’, in Thomas Christiansen, Knud 
E. Jørgensen & Antje Wiener, The Social Construction of Europe, SAGE, London, 1999, p. 182.  
55 Lene Holm Pedersen, ‘Ideas are Transformed as They Transfer: A Comparative Study of Eco-taxation in 
Scandinavia’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, p. 60. 
56 Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 309. 
57 David Levy & Ans Kolk, ’Multinational Responses to Climate Change in the Automotive and Oil Industries, in 
Kathryn Begg, Frans van der Woerd and David Levy, The Business of Climate Change, Greenleaf Publishing Sheffield, 
2005, p. 203.  
  16ExxonMobil has consistently refused to add a renewable energy branch to their energy portfolio. 
The reason given by Exxon is that the company, contrary to BP and Shell, does not see a reason “to 
get into businesses that would require a government subsidy in order for it to appear profitable on 
the bottom line.”
58 In the 80’s Exxon was flirting with the development of RES, but when the 
Reagan administration took over from the Carter administration in 1984 it abruptly cut the subsidies 
to RES, which, according to Exxon, produced a 500 million USD company loss and led Exxon to 
cancel all its activities in this field.
59  
Shell and BP, on the other hand, began to see renewables as a potentially profitable business 
in the 90’s. In 1997 Shell announced the creation of an independent renewables branch, which was 
to invest half a billion US dollars over the following five years. As Shell put it, “this investment in 
new renewable sources may look relatively modest in comparison with the group's other core 
businesses, because the economics are only gradually becoming more favourable”.
60 In 1997 the 
renewables activities of Shell did, though, only encompass biomass, forestry and solar energy, and 
not wind. This changed over the course of time, and today Shell sees wind-energy as one of the 
energy sources that holds the largest potential, and Shell is involved in a number of energy wind 
farms in the US and Europe. Amongst other projects is a 200 millions euro joint venture investment 
in the first off-shore wind farm in the Netherlands, with an average annual electricity production 
equivalent to the power consumption of 100.000 households.
61 Hence, Shell’s belief that 
renewables constitute a profitable business opportunity has only been strengthened since 1997 and 
has also been modified to also including wind-energy.  
                                                 
58 EurActiv.com, ExxonMobil’s Top-executives on Climate Change Policy, available at: 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/exxonmobil-top-executives-climate-change-policy/article-161664, 7 May 
2007. 
59 Jesse Uzzell, op. cit., p. 199. 
60 Speech by Jeroen van der Veer, Managing Director of Royal Dutch Petroleum Company at press conference in 
London, 6
th October 1997, http://www.shell.com/home/content/media-
en/news_and_library/speeches/1997/shellinternationalr_10171404.html, accessed 10 October 2007. 
61 Shell Renewables, http://www.shell.com/home/content/rw-
br/news_and_library/press_releases/2007/noordzeewind7_1804.html, accessed 10 October 2007.  
  17The story of BP runs more or less along similar lines. Already in 1997 Chief Executive of 
BP John Browne argued that, “I think it is a reasonable assumption that the technology of 
alternative energy supplies will also continue to move forward.”
62 At that time BP was already 
involved in the development of solar energy with a 10% global market share. The continuous 
commitment of BP to RES is underlined by the company’s 2005 decision to launch a separate 
energy business named ‘Alternative Energy’ that is responsible for investing 8 billion dollars in the 
development of RES-E over the next seven years.
63 Like Shell, BP’s belief that renewables 
constitute a profitable business opportunity has only been strengthened since 1997, but it has also 
been modified so that wind power and hydrogen power are now also seen as potential important 
areas of the energy portfolio.  
 Such different organizational experiences led the companies to have different ideas on the 
composition of a productive arrangement, and consequently to develop very different policy 
analyses. Exxon holds that RES will only be able to meet 1% of global energy demand in 2030,
64 
whereas Shell arrived at the conclusion that RES can meet around 5% of global energy demand in 
2025.
65  
Thus, while BP and Shell have increased their investments in RES over the last 10 years, 
ExxonMobil does not express any interest in developing a renewables business. Hence, BP and 
Shell have learned and Exxon has not, which shows that actors may have the same material 
interests, in this case profit-making, but what also matters is the beliefs of the actors as to how to 
                                                 
62 Speech by CEO of BP John Browne, http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=98&contentId=2000423, 
accessed 10 October 2007.  
63 BP, Annual Report and Accounts, available at: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/SI/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/ar
a_2006_annual_report_and_accounts.pdf, 7 May 2007 
64 ExxonMobil, The Outlook for Energy – A view to 2030, 2006, p. 3 available at: 
http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Citizenship/Imports/EnergyOutlook06/energy_outlook_2006_notes.pdf, 8 May 
2007. 
65 Shell, http://www.shell.com/home/content/aboutshell 
en/energy_challenge/energy_mix/the_changing_energy_mix_000407.html, 7 May 2007. 
  18realize these preferences.
66  
Furthermore, the more complex the world, the more uncertain the actors become.
67 In 
energy policy uncertainty is generally high. Energy infrastructure is build to last for several 
decades, and time-horizons on the pay-off from investments are correspondingly long and therefore, 
by nature, more uncertain. In the same way, estimations of how much oil and gas can be extracted 
from underground varies considerably. Second the majority of the oil and gas reserves of the world 
are located in politically unstable countries. The level of uncertainty is aggravated by the current 
debates over climate change. Negotiations on climate change abatement policy mechanisms are 
ongoing and the outcome, both in terms of which level of emission standards and which type of 
policy instruments will be decided on, is difficult to predict due to the differing views and needs of 
the countries involved in the negotiations.
68 The uncertainty renders the margin for different ideas 
about what constitutes a productive arrangement large, which contributes to the different 
assessments of Exxon on the hand and BP and Shell on the other hand. 
Consequently the example actually offers an answer to the meta-theoretical and 
epistemological debate between the two institutionalisms: The relation between the two 
institutionalisms can be understood as one of sequencing, where the strategic, rational and 
exogenously given behavior predicted in rational choice institutionalism is endogenously embedded 
in a broader institutional and cultural context.
69   
4.3 From Policy Learning to Policy Change 
The analytical framework above has been used to exemplify how Shell and BP have 
learned. But clearly not all processes of policy learning lead to policy change.
70 Consequently, it is 
                                                 
66 John Kurt Jacobsen, ‘Review: Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy’, World Politics, 
Vol. 47, No. 2, 1995, p. 290. 
67 Jacobsen, op. cit, p. 290. 
68 Bleischwitz, Latsch & Andersen, op. cit., p. 5. 
69 Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel, op. cit., p. 22. 
70 Minstrom & Vergari, op. cit., p. 422. 
  19analytically crucial to distinguish policy learning from policy change, and to undertake a separate 
analysis of the relation between the learning of certain actors and the policy change studied in order 
to understand what and how policy learning caused a change in policy.
71 These pages do not permit 
a thorough treatment of the link between the policy learning of the energy companies and the EU 
policy change, but a few remarks should be made on the issue.  
What permits some actors to convert their policy learning into policy change is obviously 
a question of influence, and the concept of influence and how to measure it is another debated 
question of political science.
72 The length of this paper does not permit an extensive treatment of 
the question, and this study therefore takes a minimalist approach by defining influence as the 
ability to move policy in the desired direction.
73  
It is very difficult to draw up generalizations on levels of influence in EU policy making.
74 
It is, however, a plausible argument that financial heavyweighters generally enjoy an important 
position in EU policy making.
75 The energy field is no exception and big players such as BP and 
Shell have traditionally been able to exert their influence on EU decision making.
76 In this way the 
more positive stand on RES from Shell and BP has facilitated the policy change represented by the 
decision 8-9 March 2007. What is more, with their investments and their positive communication 
on RES, BP and Shell have contributed to legitimizing RES-E as a serious and profitable alternative 
                                                 
71 Ibid 
72 Irina Michalowitz, ‘What Determines Influence? Assessing Conditions for Decision-making Influence of Interest 
Groups’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, p. 132.  
73 Chris Hilson, ‘New Social Movements: the Role of Legal Opportunity’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 9, 
No. 2, 2002, p. 242. This definition is, however, not without its problems. An analysis that claims that actor X 
influenced policy change Y, without specifying the criteria for measuring this influence, is in principle unverifiable. It 
would require a parallel policy-process without the presence of actor X to verify that the policy change would not have 
been produced, had it not been for actor X. In the lack of a better approach this approach is nevertheless applied to the 
analysis in the same way as other studies do. See e.g. Irina Michalowitz, The EU in Search for its Balance 2004, 
available at: http://www.cevipof.msh-paris.fr/rencontres/colloq/emiliano/textes/0409241630Michalowitz.pdf, 7 May 
2007.   
74 Peter Bouwen, ‘Corporate Lobbying in the European Union, The Logic of Access”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 366 
75 Greenwood, op. cit., p. 45. 
76 Janne Haaland Matláry, Energy Policy in the European Union, Macmillian, London, 1997, p. 96. 
  20to fossil fuels in the eyes of a traditionally RES-skeptic business community, instead of only being 
seen as an unreliable source of energy advocated by idealistic environmentalists, thus creating a 
political climate in which progressive RES decisions are easier to take for political decision makers.  
 
5. Conclusion  
We are now in a position to conclude on the paper, which raised two questions. First is 
how policy learning in the European Union should be studied. The paper showed how a revised 
version of the ACF, based on both institutionalisms, permits a very productive analysis of learning. 
The incorporation of the institutionalisms permits a more subtle understanding of learning due to 
the conceptual clarity that the institutionalisms introduce into the ACF. It was also shown that an 
instrumental way of learning is not limited to the secondary aspect level of the belief system, but 
that actors can also learn instrumentally on the policy core, as is the case of Shell and BP. The idea 
that complex empirical phenomena such as policy process of the European Union require complex 
and versatile analytical tools is therefore confirmed, in that both rational and ideational ways of 
learning can be identified despite the fact that the energy companies constitute a least likely case 
due to their material preferences.  
Secondly, the paper asked if any empirical conditions can be identified under which either 
of the two new institutionalisms holds a greater explanatory power compared to the other 
institutionalism. The study indicates that the rational choice institutionalism is more appropriate 
when analyzing processes of learning that are embedded in relatively rapidly changing institutional 
contexts. In these cases actors judge the situation on the basis of the changed institutional 
environment and reassess their strategies for pursuing their preferences. Consequently it is mainly 
the strategies that change. 
When the time horizon is short, preferences remain exogenous, but preferences are 
  21always embedded in a broader institutional context. Consequently, over a longer enough period of 
time even material and exogenous interests become the subject of ideational learning, in that the 
endogenous institutional context that actors are always embedded in exerts its influence. In this way 
sociological institutionalism appears to be the more appropriate approach when analyzing learning 
processes that are embedded in a context of a long time span. In these examples it is not only the 
strategy that changes but the preferences themselves – even if the preferences are material as in the 
case of BP and Shell. Furthermore, the ideational learning processes can be greatly accelerated by 
high levels of uncertainty, which is what characterizes the energy policy field today. In conclusion, 
the time horizon involved is an important variable when choosing the analytical approach to 
learning.
77 In general, the relationship between the two institutionalisms can be described as one of 
sequencing, where the strategic and exogenously given behavior predicted in rational choice 
institutionalism is endogenously embedded in a broader institutional and cultural context.   
This theoretical point, however, should not cloud the methodological middle-ground 
based point of this paper: when analyzing complex processes of policy learning in the EU, complex 
analytical tools are needed. This paper has suggested one useful model – the ACF, supplemented 
with rational choice and sociological institutionalisms. It is the hope of this author that more 




                                                 
77 Obviously, what constitutes a long, medium and short time perspective can not be defined once and for all but 
arguably varies according to the characteristics of a certain policy area and calls for further research. 
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